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In recent years, several experiments have shown individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behaviour in anonymous
one-shot interactions. As reciprocity has been shown to be relevant in several economic fields, there have also been
several attempts to model reciprocal behaviour. I review the intention-based models of  reciprocity and present an
example in teachers management in the public sector in which government offers an incentive scheme to implement
a program. The incentive scheme has a prisoner’s dilemma structure. In both simultaneous and sequential games,
in equilibrium reciprocal teachers may reach other equilibria different from those predicted by the standard theory.
Key words: Game theory, psychological games, Intention-based models, reciprocal behaviour.
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RESUMEN
Recientemente, varios experimentos han mostrado que los individuos exhiben un comportamiento auténticamente
recíproco en interacciones anónimas que se dan una sola vez (’one-shot’). En tanto que se ha mostrado que la
reciprocidad es relevante en múltiples campos de la economía, han existido varios intentos por modelar el compor-
tamiento recíproco. Este documento revisa los modelos de reciprocidad que se fundamentan en las intenciones y
presenta un ejemplo para el caso del manejo de los profesores en el sector público, en el que el gobierno ofrece un
esquema de incentivos para la implementación de un programa. Este esquema tiene la estructura del dilema del
prisionero. Tanto en los juegos simultáneos como secuenciales, los resultados de equilibrio pueden ser distintos a los
que predice la teoría convencional.
Palabras clave: teoría de juegos, juegos sicológicos, modelos basados en intenciones, reciprocidad.
Clasificación JEL: C700.
* This paper was presented as a DEA mémoire to the MPSE - Ecole Doctorale de Science Economique of the
Université de Toulouse 1. I want to thank Paul Seabright and Emmanuelle Auriol for their comments.4 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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1. INTRODUCTION
From several years ago, other social sciences different from economics like psychology,
sociology and anthropology have pointed out human beings tend to reciprocate each other.
Until recent years it had not been clear whether this behaviour was only caused by some
expectations of future rewards or, at least in some cases, it was genuine reciprocal behaviour.
If the first explanation was true, the usual economic hypothesis that individuals behave in a
self-interested manner could explain those behaviours. Nevertheless, from two decades ago,
several experiments have shown individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behaviour in anonymous
one-shot interactions. For example, in the ultimatum game a pair of individuals has to distribute
a fixed sum of money in a sequential move game. The “proposer” has to divide the amount
between himself and the second subject. The “responder” can accept or reject the proposed
division. If individuals were rational and self-interested, the responder would accept any quantity
of money and the proposer would give the smallest possible quantity. However, evidence shows
offers lower than 20% are atypical and rejected with a high probability, while offers close to 50%
are very common and rarely rejected (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2001).
On the other hand, in the gift-exchange game the proposer (employer) offers a wage to the
responder (worker). The worker can either reject or accept it. If the worker rejects both players
gain nothing. If the worker accepts she has to exert a costly effort. The higher the effort, both
the lower the payoff she gets and the higher the income the employer receives. Under the
standard assumptions, the worker will always choose the lowest effort and the employer will only
offer the lowest possible wage. Evidence suggests wages are clearly higher than minimum levels
and wages and effort have a positive relation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2001).
Those and other experiments have shown individuals actually reciprocate each other. A
reciprocal individual rewards kind behaviour and punishes unkind behaviour. The gift-giving
game illustrates the former, sometimes called positive reciprocity, and the ultimatum game the
latter (negative reciprocity). Additionally, it has been shown reciprocity can have an important
role in some economic fields. In labour economics, questionnaire studies have shown managers
are unwilling to cut wages because it can adversely affect work morale. Effectively, wages cuts are
considered as an insult by the workers (Bewley, 1995). Besides, Akerlof (1982) suggests reciprocal
behaviour can explain why wages remain above the market clearing level. In fact, this is supported
by some experiments that have shown reciprocity contributes to the enforcement of contracts,
as loyalty and trust are relevant in labour relationships. Further experiments show individuals
punish free-riders in public good provision games even if it reduces their own payoffs; material
incentives may crowd-out implicit incentives that rely on reciprocal behaviour and reciprocity
can explain why in reality contracts are incomplete, among other facts.1 All these phenomena
cannot be explained assuming the self-interest hypothesis.
There have been several attempts to model reciprocal behaviour. In this document I review
the so-called intention-based models of reciprocity, particularly the models proposed by Rabin
1 Fehr and Gächter (2000) survey experimental evidence. Frey (2001) also surveys circumstantial and econometric
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(1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2001). This approach emphasizes in the fact that
reciprocal individuals want to reward kind intentions and to punish unkind intentions. To illustrate
these theories I propose two examples in teachers’ management. The first one consists in a game
that models teachers’ strategic behaviour in the following situation: government wants to improve
quality of public education for which it intends to implement a program to make better teachers’
abilities. Government offers an incentive scheme that has a prisoner’s dilemma structure to
enforce the program; in such a way that standard game theory will predict both teachers are
going to participate. The second game slightly modifies the material payoffs of the first one. I
obtain that, in both simultaneous and sequential games, reciprocal teachers may deviate from
participation in equilibrium, as they consider participation as an unkind behaviour. Instead no
participation is regarded as a kind behaviour. Of course, participation of both teachers may also
be an equilibrium when each teacher believes the other is going to participate. In that case, both
teachers punish the other’s unkind intention.
The text is organized in three sections. In the first one, I provide an overview of the economic
theories about reciprocity in order to give a context to the intention-based theories. The second
one is divided in several subsections in which I present the examples and the theories mentioned.
With expositive purposes I first introduce the example and show the results obtained using the
standard theory, and then I provide the model of reciprocity and the new results. Last section
offers conclusions.
2. MODELLING RECIPROCITY
In the standard theory self-interest hypothesis is formalized by defining individual preferences
solely on the material resources the individual has. One way to model reciprocal behaviour is
enlarging the space in which individual preferences are defined to include others’ material payoffs
or welfare. “When an individual does not only care about the material resources allocated to her
but also cares about the relevant reference agents”, we will say she has social preferences (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2001 p. 2).
In fact, most of the theories that try to model reciprocity introduce it as a social preference.
These theories have had into account reciprocity has two elements in nature: it is not only related
to the consequences of others’ actions but also to the others’ intentions. They have focused on one
of those elements of reciprocal behaviour. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) stress the fact that people desire to maintain equity and provide models of inequity aversion.
On the other hand, Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2001) emphasize persons
want to punish nasty intentions and to reward friendly intentions. Levine (1998) builds a model in
which individuals do not respond to intentions but to the type of person they face. The type is
determined by the degree of altruism the individual has. Charness and Rabin (2000) and Falk and
Fischbacher (2000) develop theories that have elements from both intention-based reciprocity and
inequity aversion models. Finally, Segal and Sobel (1999) present an axiomatic treatment of reciprocity
and altruism which is compatible with some of the social preferences models of reciprocal behaviour.
It is worthy to point out that some inequity aversion models, which only concern about
payoffs distribution, can mimic some predictions of intention-based reciprocity models. However,6 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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though intention-regarding models can be much more difficult to handle than inequity aversion
models, experimental evidence suggests people punish others even if punishment does not
reduce inequity.3 In the following section I present the pure intention-based economic models
of reciprocity.
3. MODELS OF INTENTION-BASED RECIPROCITY
In these models in deciding what action individuals are going to follow they have into account
not only their material payoff but also their beliefs about others’ kindness. Specifically, individual
utility is composed by two parts: a material payoff, which is given in terms of some measurable
quantity, e.g. money; and a reciprocity payoff that she obtains from assessing the others’ kindness.
So, individuals will do the action that gives them the highest utility regarding both payoffs.
For example, consider the game in Figure 1. It presents a prisoner’s dilemma. As usual when
individuals only care about their own material payoff the Nash equilibrium is no cooperation for
both persons. However, notice that when an individual chooses no cooperation instead of
cooperation she is reducing the other’s material payoff. So, when one of the agents decides to
cooperate, it can be interpreted by the other as a kind action, since the former reduces his payoff
and increases the latter’s at the same time. If both players have high enough sensitivity to reciprocity
concerns, cooperation can be the best option for them.
FIGURE 1
2 For a complete discussion in this regard, look at Falk and Fischbacher (2000).
It is worthy to point out that beliefs on kindness are formed assessing the other’s
intentions. If player 1’s action increases her payoff and the player 2’s payoff simultaneously,
player 2 will probably not consider that action as kind. Further, it can happen that even if one
player “sacrifices” his material payoff she is to be considered as no kind. For instance, in the
game depicted in Figure 1, assume player 2 have no option different from cooperation. Somehow
this player is forced to cooperate. So, we have a degenerate game composed by the left column
of the game. In this case, player 1 will not believe player 2 is being kind by cooperating, as the
latter has no choice.
To illustrate the theories considered in this document, we are going to analyze a qualitative
example from the teachers’ management. In the next section is posed the basic problem.DARWIN CORTÉS CORTÉS 7
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3.1. A QUALITATIVE EXAMPLE OF TEACHERS’ MANAGEMENT
Assume a government utilizes two teachers in offering public education. There is a teachers’
trade union so that if both take the same decision with respect to government policies, government
cannot punish them. Assume as well government wants to improve the quality of education
offered and hence decide to implement a program that rise teachers abilities.
In order to exert that policy, government brings out an incentive scheme as follows: If both
teachers do not participate in the program, government cannot fire them and they continue gaining
the same payoff as before, say X. If both teachers enter in the program, they do a higher effort and
obtain the same payment X.3 Payoffs cannot be lower than X because otherwise trade union would
impede implementation of the governmental program.4 Finally, if teachers take different decisions,
trade union is not working anymore, so the teacher who does not participate is fired and obtains his
reservation utility and the teacher who participates receives a payoff X + d higher than X.
It is also assumed that teachers take their decision simultaneously. The game is depicted in
Figure 2. It is easy to see that the incentive scheme has a prisoner’s dilemma structure. Government
persuades teachers to participate offering a contingent reward d to deter trade union obstructions.
Thus, players have an incentive to participate in the program independently from the other’s
choice. In such a model, if teachers only care about their material payoff, the unique Nash
Equilibrium in pure strategies is (participate, participate).
FIGURE 2
3 Moral hazard is not an issue here but it should be in a more realistic model.
4 In fact, the game structure is preserved even if participation payoffs are higher than X. It would be enough to
assume the participation premium to be lesser than d.
3.2 INTRODUCING RECIPROCITY
Suppose both teachers regard niceness, so they draw utility from reciprocity concerns. Notice
that in this example, as in the first one, when a player attempts to maximize her material payoff
reduces the other’s payoff. As teachers are reciprocal, they will reward friendly actions and will
punish hostile actions. Assume teacher 2 has chosen to participate, so she can obtain either X + d
or X. If teacher 1 chooses to participate as well, he not only minimizes teacher 2’s payoff (she
would obtain X instead of X + d) but also maximizes his (he would get X instead of 0). Thus, this
action could be considered unkind by teacher 2 and hence she would not be willing to deviate from
participation because otherwise she would reward teacher 1.8 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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Now suppose teacher 1 chooses not to participate, so teacher 2 gets X + d instead of X. In
this case, teacher 2 perceives teacher 1 is giving up X for giving her d and hence she could believe
teacher 1’ action to be kind. In this situation, teacher 2 would be unkind to player 1 if she
remains participating. So as teacher 2 is reciprocal she could change her decision (from participation
to no participation) if she is better off doing so.
Notice that one player’s assessment of the other’ kindness depends not only on what the
former believes the latter is going to do but also what the former believes the latter believes the
former is going to do. To form both beliefs, fairness of intentions is determined assessing the
equitability of the final payoffs’ distribution with regard to the feasible set of payoffs. Doing so
each player will compare utility she gets in both situations: participation brings her a higher
material payoff than no participation. Instead, no participation brings her a higher reciprocity
payoff than participation. So, if her reciprocity sensitivity is high enough, teacher 2 will decide to
give up d of her own payoff for giving teacher 1 X. Doing the same analysis for the other
teacher, we obtain that with reciprocal teachers we have two possible equilibria:5 (not participate,
not participate) and (participate, participate).
But, when (not participate, not participate) will be chosen? It depends on both the notion of
fairness and reciprocity sensitivity players have, and the amount of the material payoffs. To see
this it is needed to introduce a formal model of reciprocity.
3.3. RABIN (1993)’S MODEL
Rabin (1993) models reciprocity based on psychological games proposed by Geanakoplos,
Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) (hereafter GPS). In such games, players’ payoffs depend not only
on players’ actions but also on their beliefs. GPS show that many standard concepts have useful
analogues in the framework they develop.
Rabin’s goal is to derive psychological games from “material” games. Let us consider a normal
form game with two players, player 1 and player 2, who have mixed strategy sets and A1, respectively,
obtained from pure finite strategy sets S1 and S2. Player i’s material payoff is given by the function
12 : i AA π ×→ ℜ .
In order to construct the psychological game, let us assume that when a player chooses her
strategy, her subjective utility function will depend on three things: her strategy, her belief about
the other’s strategy and her belief about the other’s belief about her strategy.6 Let us call  11 aA ∈ and
22 aA ∈ the strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively;  11 bA ∈ and  22 bA ∈ player 2’s belief
about player 1’s strategy and player 1’s belief about player 2’s strategy, respectively; and  11 cA ∈
and  22 cA ∈  player 1’s belief about player 2’s belief about player 1’s strategy and player 2’s belief
about player 1’s belief about player 2’s strategy. Observe that although ai, bi and ci belong to the
5 In the next section, we will call them fairness equilibria.
6 Higher order beliefs can be considered but it is enough to take the first two.DARWIN CORTÉS CORTÉS 9
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same set, they are different in nature as ai is a player i’s decision, bi is player j’s belief () ji ≠  and ci
is a player i’s belief.
To incorporate reciprocity (fairness in terms of Rabin) in the model we first need to define a
kindness function  () , iij fa b which measures how kind player i is to player j. If player i believes
player j chooses  j b , how kind is player i by choosing  i a ? When player i chooses  i a , is selecting
a payoff pair  () () () ,, , iij jj i ab ba ππ from the set of all the feasible payoffs to player j when he
chooses  j b . Let us call this set  ( ) () () () {} ,, , ji j j j i ba b b a a A ππ Π= ∈ .
How kind player i is being depends on both the point she chooses from  () j b Π and the
notion of kindness players have. To express this notion in formal terms, we need to define a
function for both player i’s kindness to player j and player i’s belief about how kind player j is
being to her. Rabin (1993) provides some general properties that sort of functions must have.
The following payoffs are useful to do that: let  ()
h
jj b π  be player j’s highest payoff in  () j b Π ,
()
l
jj b π  be player j’s lowest payoff among the Pareto- efficient points in  () j b Π , and  ()
e
jj b π be
an “equitable payoff” in  () j b Π .
The following properties for kindness functions are sufficient conditions for the main result
Rabin obtains:7
Property 1: A kindness function must be bounded and increasing. A kindness function
() , iij fa b is bounded and increasing if:
a. There exists a number N such that  () [] ,, iij fa b N N ∈− for all  i aA ∈ and  j bA ∈  and;
b.   ()( ) ,’ , iij i ij fa b fab > if and only if  ()( ) ,, ’ jj i jj i ba ba ππ > .
This property rules out the possibility of fairness to generate infinitely positive or infinitely
negative utility and brings out a positive association between the player j’s payoff and player i’
kindness: given  j b , the higher player j’ payoff is, the kinder player i is.
Property 2: A kindness function must be a Pareto split. A kindness function  () , iij fa b is a
Pareto split if there exists some  ()
e
jj b π  such that:
7 They are presented as definitions in Appendix A in Rabin (1993), p. 1297. For additional results is also needed
to assume kindness function to be affine, but that property is not relevant for our present purposes.10 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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a. ()( ) ,
e
jj i jj ba b ππ > implies that  () ,0 iij fa b> ;  ()( ) ,
e
jj i jj ba b ππ = implies that  () ,0 iij fa b= ;
and  ()( ) ,
e
jj i jj ba b ππ < implies that  () ,0 iij fa b< ;
b. () () ()
hel
jj jj jj bbb πππ ≥≥ ; and
c. if  () ()
hl
jj jj bb ππ > , then  () () ()
hel
jj jj jj bbb πππ >>
This property says that the fair payoff to player j is strictly between the best and the worst
Pareto efficient payoffs in  () j b Π , provided that Pareto efficient set is not a singleton.
Among the class of functions defined by the previous properties, Rabin picks the following:































= . If  () ()
min 0
h
jj j j bb ππ −=  then  () ,0 iij fa b=
It is easy to check this function has the general properties presented above: First,  0 i f =  if
and only if player j receives the equitable payoff. This is so because when  () ()
min h
jj j j bb ππ = player
j always gains the same payoff and there is no kindness issue. Second,  0 i f <  when player j’s
payoff is lesser than the equitable payoff. This happens when either  () , jj i ba π is a Pareto-efficient
point smaller than the equitable payoff or  () , jj i ba π is not an efficient point. Finally,  0 i f >
only if player j’ s payoff is greater his equitable payoff and the Pareto set is not singleton. Notice
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Player i’s belief about how nice player j is to her can be expressed as a function  () , jj i fb c ! .
This function is formally equal to the previous but it relates the two levels of beliefs considered
in the model.






















ii c π and  ()
e
ii c π have analogue definitions. If  () ()
min 0
h
ii i i cc ππ −= then
() ,0 jj i fb c= ! .
Using both functions  () , iij fa band  () , jj i fb c ! we can define a utility function for player i.
Doing so, we are assuming players have a shared notion of fairness. This utility function integrates
the material payoff and the reciprocity payoff:8
( )() () () ,, , , 1 , iij i iij i jj i iij Ua bc a b Y fbc fa b π  ≡+ + 
!
The first term is the material payoff and the second the reciprocity payoff. The constant  i Y
reflects how sensitive player i is to reciprocity matters regarding player j and we will assume it is
positive. This utility function gathers the main feature about reciprocal behaviour. If player i
believes player j is treating her unkindly  () () ,0 jj i fb c< ! , she will want to punish him being
unkind, that is choosing  i a such that  () , iij fa bto be low. On the contrary, if player i thinks
player j is being nice  () () ,0 jj i fb c> ! , she will be nice. Furthermore, the higher () , jj i fb c !  is, the
more material payoff player i is willing to give up to reward player j. Finally, this utility function
has the property that whenever player j is hostile to player i, player i’s utility is lesser than her
material payoff. That is, an individual is not able to completely recover her welfare taking revenge
once other has treated her badly.
These preferences together to the elements already defined for the material game form a
psychological game. Using the concept of psychological Nash Equilibrium defined by GPS,
Rabin (1993) proposes the following definition,
Definition 3: The pair of strategies () ( ) 12 12 ,, aa AA ∈ is a fairness equilibrium if, for  1, 2 i = ,
ji ≠ ,
a. () argmax , ,
i ia A i j i aU a b c ∈ ∈
b. iii cba ==
This notion of equilibrium is analogous to Nash Equilibrium, but applied to psychological
games. Condition b. of the definition requires all high-level beliefs to correspond actual behaviour.
8 This utility function is slightly different from which Rabin uses. We have added the term in the reciprocity payoff.12 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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 Considering again our example, we can calculate the teachers’ utility functions regarding
reciprocity. Though theory is posed for mixed strategies we only analyze equilibriums in pure
strategies. In Figure 3, we can see the utility values once condition b. of fairness equilibrium is
satisfied.
FIGURE 3
First, note that when player i is being unkind to player j, player j’s reciprocity payoff is negative,
which reduces his overall utility and introduces incentives to deviate. However, the profile of
strategies (participate, participate) is a fairness equilibrium for all values of X and  i Y  because
response for unkindness is unkindness. Consider now, what happens if player i deviates to no
participation. This action increases player j’s reciprocity payoff because he considers player i is
being kind. In fact, player j will deviate to no participation strategy if the loss in material payoff,
δ , is less than the gain in reciprocity payoff, 
1
2
j Y . The profile (not participate, not participate)
will be a fairness equilibrium whenever 
1
2
i Y δ <  for  1, 2 i = . This condition is satisfied when
either δ  is low enough or  i Y  is high enough. If the government gives a reward too little when one
teacher participates and the other does not or if both teachers have a strong feeling to reciprocate
the other, deviating from participation will be an equilibrium.
This model has been extended to include sequential actions. In principle, such a model would
be more adequate to reality because reciprocal actions have an implicit delay. One is kind with
somebody that has been kind. Besides, “extending the model to sequential games is also essential
for applied research” (Rabin (1993), p. 1296), as individuals can change their motivation due to
information provided by past decisions.
3.4 SEQUENTIAL GAMES
Consider now a slightly modified sequential version of our game of teachers, depicted in
Figure 4. Assume there is no trade union anymore, so government can offer a lesser material
payoff if both teachers participate in the program, X-ε , 0 X ε << . In the first step, teacher 1
decides whether to participate or not in the program offered and once he has decided, teacher 2
has to take her decision. Assuming further no reciprocity (and perfect and complete information),
it can be seen, solving by backward induction, the profile (Participate, participate) will be theDARWIN CORTÉS CORTÉS 13
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unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Government’s strategy to implement the program is
completely successful as teachers will always participate.
Let us introduce reciprocity. Suppose 1 chooses do not participate (NP) in the program.
Player 2 can choose either X or X+δ  (or mix). Her choice will depend on both her kindness and
the belief she has about the 1’s intention to choose NP. When teacher 1 chooses NP gives
teacher 2 a payoff at least X and at most X+δ . Instead, when teacher 1 chooses P gives teacher
2 a payoff at least 0 and at most X-ε . So 2 will believe 1 is being kind when he chooses NP and
if reciprocity payoff is high enough she will choose X instead of X+δ  (or mix). To establish if
(NP, np) will be an equilibrium, we have to evaluate what teacher 1 believes when 2 chooses np.
FIGURE 4
It is convenient to point out one difference in the analysis of reciprocity in normal games and
extensive games. In normal games teacher 2 will always choose do not participate, provided
reciprocity payoff supersedes material payoff. This does not happen in a sequential model because,
for instance, once teacher 2 knows teacher 1 has chosen to participate, there is no reason to
maintain the decision of do not participate unconditionally. In that case teacher 2 would consider
teacher 1 is being hostile and thus she would participate in the program as well. Unlike normal
games, in sequential games unconditional np does not occur because player 2 is optimizing in
each subgame.
On the other hand, in modelling reciprocity in sequential games it is not plausible to assume
players are going to keep their initial beliefs along the game. Player 2’s belief about how kind
player 1 is being once the latter has decided do not participate is different from the former’s
belief once the latter has decided to participate. It means it is necessary to analyze changes in
beliefs in each node of the game in order to establish equilibrium conditions. Furthermore, it is
not possible to consider each subgame separately. Player 2’ belief about how nice is player 1,
given he has already decided to not participate, depends on which payoffs she would had had if
player 1 had decided to participate. Therefore, backward induction cannot be used to obtain the
equilibrium. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2001) (henceforth DK (2001)) provide a concept of14 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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sequential reciprocity which allows them to propose a new solution concept, Sequential Reciprocity
Equilibrium (SRE).
3.5 DUFWENBERG AND KIRCHSTEIGER (2001)’S MODEL
As we have said, when reciprocity is incorporated in sequential games it is necessary to distinguish
between a player’ initial and subsequent belief. Once a subgame has been attained, a player’s belief
can change and, as kindness depends on belief, kindness may therefore change as well. DK (2001)
deal with this by keeping track of how beliefs change when a new subgame is reached and by
assuming players’ choices take into account the beliefs they hold in the most recently reached
subgame. To do that, as Rabin they adopt the psychological games framework; but unlike GPS
(1989), who only regards to games where solely initial beliefs can affect player’s assessments, DK
(2001) propose a notion of reciprocity in which player’s beliefs change in each subgame.
Formally, they pose a t-player extensive form game without nature and with perfect recall.
Any such a game Γ  is described by a finite set of nodes organized in a tree, a collection of
information sets, a set of choices available at each decision node, a function assigning each
information set to the player who moves at the decision nodes in that set, and a collection of
payoff functions assigned to each endnode (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995)). Let
{} 1,..., Tt = be the set of players where  2 t ≥ . It is convenient to add new notation to that used
in section 3.3, as there are now several players. Let Ai be the set of player i’s behaviour strategies,
i a ;  ij B be the set of possible player i’s beliefs about player j’s strategies,  ij b ; and  ijk C be the set of
player i’s belief about player j’s belief about player k’s strategies,  ijk c . As in Rabin’s model, beliefs
are mixed strategies, so we have  ij j BA =  and  ijk jk k CBA == . Besides, player i’s material payoff
is now given by the function  : i A π →ℜ where  iT i AA ∈ =Π .
Now, let us proceed to formalize how the player’s beliefs change when new subgames are
reached. To keep track of how each player’s behaviour, niceness and perception of other’s
niceness differ across subgames, let R be the set of nodes that are starting nodes of all possible
subgames in Γ , and let Γ r be the subgame which starting point is rR ∈ . Let us define the r-
part of Γ r  as the set of nodes in Γ r  that do not belong to some proper subgame of Γ r. For a
strategy  ii aA ∈ , let  () i arbe the strategy that has the same choices as  i a but assigning a
probability equal to 1 to the choices that drive to node r. In an analogous way, define  () ij br and
() ijk cr  for  ij ij bB ∈ and  ijk ijk cC ∈ , respectively. Thus, player i decides to play  i a believing other
players are playing () ij ij b
≠ and believing () ijk jk c
≠ , whereas in the r-part of the subgame Γ r ,
player i is playing  () ii ar A ∈ and believing other players to play  () () ij ij br
≠ and to believe
() () ijk jk cr
≠ . This means that “even if players initially believe that others mix their choices, theDARWIN CORTÉS CORTÉS 15
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subsequent perception of kindness is triggered by the actual choice” (DK (2001), p. 8). In
terms of our example, consider the proper subgame starting in the player 2’s right side node
and call that node r. Player 2 believes player 1 is choosing his strategy as  () 21 ’1 ’ bp N P p P =+ −.
Before 1 plays, at node r if is big (1 or near 1) player 2 will think player 1 is kind. However, once
r is reached, player 2 does not consider player 1 to be kind anymore. At r, player 2’s belief is
() 21 br P = .
DK (2001) also change the notion of efficiency suggested by Rabin (1993), which says that
the lowest efficient strategy is chosen from  () j b Π . They argue that, in a sequential game
framework, the set of Pareto-efficient strategies relevant to establish the equitable payoff cannot
depend on beliefs, as this can drive us to no existence of equilibrium.9 DK (2001)’s efficiency
notion can be formulated as
{ i Ea i A i =∈ there exists no  ’ ii aA ∈ such that for all  () , ij i j ji ra A k T ≠ ≠ ∈∈ ∏ ∈  it holds that
() () () ()() () () () ’, , , ki j ki j ji ji ar ar ar ar ππ
≠≠ ≥  with strict inequality for some  () ( )} ,, j ji ra k
≠
The concept of efficiency has a central role in the intention-based theories. To illustrate this
point consider the game depicted in Figure 5. We have the same game of Figure 4 but now player
1 can do an action Z in which both players obtain a payoff -2X. Let us suppose player 1 believes
with probability one player 2 is playing the strategy np, p. It can be seen 1 believes he selects the
material payoff  () 2 ,  Pn pp x πε =−  from the feasible set {} ,, 2 xx x ε −− . In the game of Figure
4, player 1 would be considered unkind, now are we willing to accept player 1 is being kind due
to the mere possibility of Z to be chosen? To rule out this unreasonable consideration we
restrict our attention to efficient payoffs in order to determine the equitable payoff. DK (2001)
propose the notion of efficiency above to do that.10
We can define the equitable payoff as () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) ( )
i j j i
l
j i j ij i
h
j i j j
e
j bi a b a bi
i
≠ ≠ ≠ + = , ‰ π π π , which is
essentially the same defined in section 3.3. Unlike that one, a subindex i has been added to e to indicate
that this is the equitable payoff for i and   () ( )
l
ji j ji ab i π
≠  is now the lowest payoff in Ei.
In turn, kindness , kindness’ belief and utility functions can also be defined in a similar way as
before.
9 Look at DK (2001) p. 29 for an example of no existence of equilibria due to a belief dependent concept of
efficiency.
10 However, this distinction does not make any difference with respect to our example, because all the strategies
are efficient under both concepts.16 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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FIGURE 5
Definition 4: Kindness of player i to another player j ≠  i in the r-part of a subgame  Γ r is
given by the function  ℜ → ≠ j i j i ij Bi A f Π  x  : defined by
  () () () ( ) () () () ( ) () ( ) ,,
i e
ij i ij j i j j ij ji ji ji fa r br a r b ir b ππ
≠≠ ≠ =−
Apart from differences already mentioned, definition 4 is analogous to definition 1. fij  differs
formally from fi  in that fij  is not normalized and thus, in principle, it may take values extremely
high or low. However, due to we are analysing central points (as we subtract an average from the
payoff chosen), it is not expectable to obtain an extreme number, so property 1a in section 3.3
can be hold without large inconveniences. On the other hand, it is straightforward to check
definition 4 holds properties 2 and 1b.
Definition 5: Player i’s beliefs about how kind player  j ≠  i is to i in the r-part of a subgame Γ r
is given by the function: ℜ → ≠ ijk j k ij iji C B f Π  x  :
~
defined by
() () () () () () () ( ) () () ( )
j k ijk
e
i j k ijk j i i k ijk j iji r c r c r bi r c r bi f
j
≠ ≠ ≠ − = π π , ,
~
This definition is formally equal to the previous. The same comments for  fij   with respect to
fi  can be done for : iji f !  in relation to  j f ! .
Definition 6: Player i’s utility in the r-part of a subgame Γ r is a function
( ) ℜ → ≠ ≠ ijk j k ij i j i i C B A U Π  x  Π  x  :  defined by





≠ ≠ i j j k ijk j i r c r ai U ,
() () () () () () ( ) () () () ( ) ( ) {} / ,, , i i ij ij ij i ij iji i j ijk ji jT i ji k j arbr Y f ar br f b r c r π
≠ ∈ ≠≠ +∑ !
Utility function in Rabin’s model has the term () 1 1 f + instead of fij. For comparison purposes,
it has been preferred to keep the functions as alike as those the authors propose. As sensitivityDARWIN CORTÉS CORTÉS 17
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for reciprocity Yij is a nonnegative number, reciprocity payoff increases utility if player i believes
player j is kind ( ) 0
~
> iji f , and reduces utility if player i believes player j is unkind ( ) 0
~
< iji f .
Appending this kind of utility functions to an extensive game, we get the tuple  () ( ) T i i U ∈ = , Γ Γ” .
DK (2001) call Γ ºa psychological game with reciprocity incentives. There is a notion of equilibrium
associated to these games that can be formulated as
Definition 7: The profile â = (âi)i∈ T is a Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE) if for all i∈ T
and for all r∈ R it holds that





≠ ≠ ∈ ∈ i j j k ijk ij i i a r A a a r Ai ai i r c r b a U r a
i i
, , max arg ￿
￿ , ￿ ,
b. j ij a b ￿ = for all i j≠
c. k ijk a c ￿ =  for all j k i j ≠ ≠ ,
where  Ai(r,a) is the set of strategies player i can use if she behaves according to ai(r) at
information sets outside the r-part of Γ r, but is free to choose any alternative in the r-part of Γ r.
Condition a. says player i maximizes his utility at node r given his beliefs and given that he
follows his equilibrium strategy outside the r-part of Γ r. This entails beliefs to assign a probability
one to the sequence of choices that allow r to be reached. Conditions b. and c. says in the
equilibrium beliefs are correct and correspond to the actual strategy. DK show every psychological
game with reciprocity incentives has at least one SRE. To do that, they first define the size of a
subgame as the number of its subgames, then they simultaneously determine equilibrium choices
of the subgames with the same size, starting from the smallest (size equal one) until arriving to
the complete game.11
In the game that appears in section 3.4, first teacher 1 decides whether to participate or not in
the program offered by the government and then teacher 2 does so. We showed there, no
reciprocity implies profile (participate, participate) to be the sole Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium. How the analysis is affected when teachers are reciprocal? We can find it out using
the theory developed in this section. When there is reciprocity between agents, the game becomes
a psychological game with reciprocity incentives. Examining SRE for different levels of reciprocity
sensitivity we can say:12
1. If teacher 2’s sensitivity to reciprocity, Y2, is low enough, profile (participate, participate) is an







2 . In this case, each player will
believe the other is going to participate, which will in turn be considered as unkind. Those
beliefs render a negative reciprocity payoff to both players and therefore each teacher prefers
to participate in the government program. From the previous inequality it can also be seen
11 Demonstration appears in DK (2001) p. 35.
12 Detailed calculations are included in the Appendix. As the game has two players, we simplify notation, so Yi,
i = 1,2, is agent i’s sensitivity to reciprocity.18 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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that given a sensitivity to reciprocate level for both teachers, Y1 and Y2, the higher δ  relative to
x and ε  is, the more likely both teachers to participate. Government should take this into
account in order to make teachers to participate in the program he proposes.
2. If teacher 2’s inclination to reciprocate, Y2, is high enough, profile (do Not Participate, do not
participate) holds in all SRE. Regardless Y1, when teacher 2 has a strong inclination to
reciprocate, she will obtain a high reciprocity payoff if teacher 1 decides to not participate, so
she will play np (instead of p) when teacher 1 does so. Notice player 2 would also get a higher
material payoff doing so than that she had obtained if teacher 1 plays P (instead of NP).
Teacher 1 knows all this, and thus he will choose to play NP to get a higher material payoff
than that he would get if he had played P. This equilibrium behaviour cannot be predicted
when we assume no reciprocity. The scheme proposed by government does not work in the
way government expects due to reciprocity between teachers.
3. Given a high 2’s leaning to reciprocate, it also happens (Participate, participate) to be an
equilibrium behaviour when teacher 1 also has a strong tendency to reciprocate. This arises
when each player thinks the other is going to play p, as each one expects an unkind action
from the other. There are “self-fulfilling expectations”.
4. For intermediate values of Y1 and Y2, equilibrium behaviours are mixed strategies. In equilibrium,







. As it can be inferred
from previous analysis, this probability increases when Y2 increases. In addition, p reduces if
the ratio between ε  and δ  decreases and increases if x increases. 
δ
ε can be viewed as the
inverse of the incentive government provides to player 2 to participate. Player 2 tries to gain
δ  (she gains d if (NP, p) is chosen) but she loses ε  if (P, p) is chosen. She evaluates how much
she can obtain and lose from participation. This evaluation affects p in the way described. On
the other hand, an increase in x increases p because ceteris paribus it makes less attractive to
participate. For player 1, it is not possible to do the same kind of analysis due to parameters
affect his probability of no participation, q, in a complex way. In fact, for a given Y2, 2’s
equilibrium behaviour is unique whereas, in general, 1’s equilibrium behaviour is not unique
for a given Y1.13
Finally, from the results obtained for this game we can analyze a sequential version of the
teacher’s game with trade union. In that game ε  = 0, so payoffs in profiles (NP, np) and (p, p) are
equal to X. The most interesting result in this case is no participation to be an equilibrium
behaviour only in mixed strategies. Analysis is as follows. We know teacher 2 will always play p
when teacher 1 plays P,14 so teacher 2 would get X in this profile. On the other hand, if teacher
1 plays NP, teacher 2 can get either X or X+δ . For (NP, p) to be possible in equilibrium, player 2
has to believe with probability one that player 1 believes player 2 will choose p. But in this
13 Look at Remarks 4 and 5 in the Appendix.
14 Look at Remark 1 in the AppendixDARWIN CORTÉS CORTÉS 19
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situation, player 2 would obtain X from both (NP, np) and (p, p) and hence there would be no
reciprocity issue (reciprocity payoff equal to zero). Therefore, player 2 would prefer to play
another strategy, as profile (NP, p) offers player 2 a higher material payoff. A similar analysis can
be done for player 1.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Evidence has shown that sometimes people behave in different ways from which is predicted
by assuming individuals are self-interested. Furthermore, when persons deviate from self-interested
behaviour they do not always try to increase the well-being of others. On the contrary, it has
been found individuals usually respond in a kind manner to kind actions and in an unkind manner
to unkind actions. In response to these findings, several economic theories have attempted to
model reciprocity behaviour. In this document, we have reviewed the so-called intention-based
theories of reciprocity, specifically the models made by Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2001).
These theories have received this name because they emphasize people want to punish hostile
intentions and to reward nice intentions. To do that, they adopt the psychological games framework
developed by Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989). In this framework individual utility
depend not only on strategies but also on beliefs. Rabin (1993) develops a theory for 2-players
normal form games and introduces a new equilibrium notion called fairness equilibrium. Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2001) in turn extend Rabin’s theory dealing with t-players sequential games and
present the notion of sequential reciprocity equilibrium. The main innovation they do is to keep track
of beliefs about intentions as the game evolves. Players maximize their behaviour in each subgame
taking into account beliefs about intentions formed in the previous stages. In a particular subgame
players use beliefs that comes from the most recently reached subgame.
There are other differences between these models. Rabin (1993) uses a kindness function
neutral to units of measure of the stakes, so that kindness cannot infinitely increase or decrease
utilities. This also allows individual kindness to reduce as long as payoffs become larger. Instead
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2001) measure kindness in the same units of material payoffs (i.e.
money), which has the advantage kindness does not disappear when payoffs rise but the
disadvantage it also makes utility to be sensitive to linear transformations as reciprocity payoff is
measured in “money squared”. Moreover, they differ in the efficiency notion used to define the
equitable payoff. Rabin (1993)’s notion depends on beliefs and then it only considers strategies
on the equilibrium path; whereas DK (2001) defines inefficient strategies as those that yield a
weakly lower payoff for all player (strictly lower for some) than other alternatives in all the
subgames. Finally, Rabin (1993) specifies kindness in the utility function in such a way to capture
the idea that whenever a player is treated unkindly, her overall utility will be lower than her
material payoff (her ability to take payback is not perfect). DK (2001)’s specification does not
capture that.
We have also illustrated the theories studied with a simple example in teachers’ management.
We have proposed an implementation mechanism for a governmental policy when there is a
teachers’ trade union. Both teachers have to decide to participate (p) or not (np) in a20 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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governmental program. In order to implement the policy, government proposes a game with
a prisoner’s dilemma structure. Without reciprocal teachers, in both games (normal and
sequential forms) there is a unique equilibrium: teachers participate in the governmental
program. With reciprocal teachers, we obtain additional results. In the normal form game,
there are two fairness equilibria: one in which each teacher is kind to the other and other in
which both teachers are unkind. If in equilibrium both teachers are kind to each other,
government cannot implement the program.
In the sequential game in turn we have multiple equilibria. We considered two games: a sequential
version of the previous one and a game in which there is no trade union and hence government
can give a lesser payoff if both teachers participate in the program. Now teacher 2 does not
choose np unconditionally as in the normal form, as teacher 2 behaves optimally off the equilibrium
path. In both games, conditional “cooperation” can be part of a SRE. However, under trade
union np is an equilibrium behaviour only in mixed strategies.
One limitation of the intention-based approach is that one individual only has reciprocal
behaviour when other individuals have shown to have kind intentions. Suppose in our example
player 2 is constrained to “choose” do not participate. Player 1 will not consider this action as
kind because player 2 has no option. In fact, although nowadays there is almost consensus about
the existence of reciprocal behaviour, there is still disagreement about the foundations of that
behaviour. For instance, other theoretical approaches focus on inequity aversion (Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000) or the type of persons one faces (Levine, 1998). Hence, in an inequity model
player 1 will behave kind when there is an inequity issue even if player 2 is forced to choose do
not participate. Discussion is opened regarding this point.15
Another limitation of this approach is that equilibrium analysis is rather complex and there
are multiple equilibria due to self-fulfilling beliefs. In the normal form game suggested, for example,
both equilibria emerge for this reason, so it is not possible to establish which one is going to
occurs. On the other hand, even though treatment of beliefs in the sequential model is very
innovative it makes difficult to build tractable models.
Finally, despite simplicity of our examples, they suggest it will be worthy to take into account
reciprocity in theories that try to model government-teachers’ relationships. On one hand, a
significant part of literature on reciprocity has shown reciprocal behaviour is relevant in the
analysis of employer-employee relationships. It has been documented employers are reluctant to
decrease wages in crisis times because they do not want to reduce employees’ morale to work. In
particular, it would be interesting to find out how reciprocity affects the main results of multiagent
settings.16 On the other hand, some empirical research has shown teachers’ trade unions can
affect negatively student performances (quality of education) (Hoxby, 1996).
15 Falk and Fischbacher (2000) show evidence that supports intentions matter. Fehr and Schmidt (2001) survey
existing models on fairness and reciprocity
16 One of the main results in these settings is that under moral hazard, principal can use relative performance of
agents to elicit a higher effort (yardstick competition). Cf. Laffont and Martimort (2002).DARWIN CORTÉS CORTÉS 21
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 APPENDIX
Equilibrium analysis of the Sequential Game
Remark 1: If teacher 1 participates, teacher 2 also participates in every SRE
Note that only the reciprocity payoff can make 2 choose np, as the material payoff per se
dictates a choice of p for 2. However, for any possible strategy of 2, teacher 2 gets less when 1
chooses P than when he chooses NP. Whatever 1 believes about 2’s strategy, 1’s choice of P is
unkind, and hence 2 must believe that 1 is unkind. Thus the reciprocity payoff as well as the
material payoff makes teacher 2 to choose p.






2 > , teacher 2 does not participate







2 , teacher 2 participates











1 − + =
δ
ε
Notice that if 1 does not participate, 2 can give 1 a material payoff of at least 0 and at most
x so the “equitable” payoff of 1 is x/2. If 2 chooses no participation, 1 receives x. Therefore, 2’s
kindness of no participation is x/2. Similarly, 2’s kindness of participation is -x/2. In order to
calculate how kind 2 believes 1 is after choosing NP we have to specify 2’s belief of 1’s belief
about 2’s choice after NP.17 Denote this by p”. Then 2’s belief about how much payoff 1 intends
to give to 2 by choosing NP is p” x+(1-p”) (x+δ ), and since 2’s payoff resulting from 1’s choice
of P would be x,18 2’s belief about 1’s kindness from choosing NP is p” x + (1 - p”)(x+δ ) - 0.5 (p”
x + (1 - p”) (x + δ ) + δ ) + x - ε ) = 0.5 ((1 - p”) δ   + ε ). This implies that when 1 does not
participate and the second order belief is p”, 2’s utility of no participation is given by x + 0.5 Y2
(x/2) ((1 - p”) δ  + ε ), whereas 2’s utility of participation is (x + δ ) -0.5 Y2 (x/2)((1 - p”) δ  + ε ). The
former is larger than the latter if Y2 (x/2) ((1 - p”) δ  + ε ) > δ . In equilibrium, the second order
belief must be correct. Hence, if in equilibrium 2 does not participate, the condition must hold





2 > . On the other hand, if in equilibrium 2 participates, that























2 2 , neither no participation nor participation can be of an equilibrium. In
17 In principle we also need 2’s belief about 1’s behavior. However, after 1 has already chosen NP, 2 already
knows what 1 has done, and 2’s belief has to be in accordance with her knowledge.
18 In any SRE player 2 participates after a participation of 1 (Remark 1)DARWIN CORTÉS CORTÉS 23
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order to have a mixed equilibrium, the utility of no participation must be equal to the utility of
participation. This is the case when  () ( ) () δ ε δ = + − p x Y 1 2 / 2 . Since in equilibrium the second order
belief correct, the actual probability of no participation, p, must be such that the condition is








Notice that probability p equals zero for Y2 = 2δ /(x (δ  + ε )), and p equals one Y2 = 2δ /ε x.
Hence, Remarks 1 and 2 together imply that for a given parameter Y2 2’s equilibrium behaviour
is unique. This is, however, in general not true for 1’s behaviour which can be characterized by
three observations:








2 , participation is the unique 1’s equilibrium behaviour.







2 teacher 2 always participates (Remarks 1 and 2). Hence, only the
reciprocity part of the utility function can make 1 to choose NP (the material payoff alone
would dictate for 1 to choose P). However, for any second order belief about 1’s behaviour 2’s
strategy of always participating is unkind. Hence, the reciprocity payoff as well as the material
payoff makes teacher 1 chooses P.





2 > , 1’s equilibrium behaviour is typified by one of the following possibilities:
a) Teacher 1 does not participate (regardless of Y1)
b) 1 > 2/(ε  + δ ) and teacher 1 participates






2 > implies that 2 does not participate when 1 does not participate and
participates when 1 participates (Remark 1 and 2). Hence, 1 can give 2 a material payoff of at
least (x- ε ) and at most x. Thus, the “equitable” payoff of 1 is x- (ε /2). If 1 chooses no participation,
2 receives x. Therefore, 1’s kindness of no participation is ε /2. Likewise, 1’s kindness of
participation is -(ε /2). In order to calculate how kind 1 believes that 2 is we have to specify 1’s
belief about what 2 believes that 1 will do. Denote by q” this second order belief of 1 choosing
NP. Then 1 believes that 2 believes that she gives teacher 1 a material payoff of q” x + (1-q”) (x- ε ) by
choosing her equilibrium strategy. If 2 always does not participates , 1’s payoff is q”x + (1- q”)(x +δ ),
whereas if 2 always participates, 1’s payoff is q”0 + (1-q”)(x-ε ). Hence, 1’s belief about 2’s kindness
from choosing np after NP and p after P is given by:  q” x + (1- q”)(x - ε ) - 0.5 (q” x  +  (1 - q”)
(x + δ )  +  q” 0 + (1 - q”) (x-ε )) = 0.5 (- ε  - δ   + q” (ε   + x + δ ))
This implies that when 2 plays the equilibrium strategy and the second order belief is q”, 1’s
utility of no participation is given by x + 0.5 Y1(ε /2)(-ε  -δ  + q”(ε  + x+ δ )), whereas 1’s utility of
participation is x - ε   - 0.5Y1 (ε /2) (- ε  - δ   + q” (ε   + x + δ )).24 INTENTION-BASED ECONOMIC THEORIES OF RECIPROCITY
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The former is larger than the latter if ε  + Y1 (ε /2) (- ε  - δ   + q” (ε   + x + δ )) = 0. In
equilibrium, the second order belief must be correct. Hence, if in equilibrium 1 does not participate,
the condition must hold for q” = 1, which is always the case.
On the other hand, if in equilibrium 1 participates, the condition must not hold for q” = 0.
This implies that Y1 > 2/(ε  + δ ). In order to have a mixed equilibrium, the utility of no participation
must be equal to the utility of participation.
This is the case when ε  +  Y1 (ε /2) (- ε  - δ   + q” (ε   + x + δ ))  = 0. Since in equilibrium the
second order belief must be correct, the actual probability of no participation, q, must be such
that the condition is fulfilled. This implies that q =  1 ((xY1  + 2)/(Y1ε   + x + δ )))
Next we turn to the equilibrium behaviour when 2 is moderately motivated by reciprocity and
hence answers a no participate choice of 1 with mixing.








2 2 < <
+
> , 1’s equilibrium behaviour is characterized by one of the
three following possibilities:19
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when 1 does not participate, and 2 participates when 1 participates (see Remarks 1
and 2). Hence, 1 can give 2 a material payoff of at least (x - ε ) and most p x + (1-p) (x + δ ). Hence,




px δε −− + . If 1 chooses no participation, 2 receives p x




p δε −− . Similarly, 1’s
19 To obtain the specific right-hand side values of these inequalities we assume . This assumption is no essential
and it is made to simplify calculations. Analogous results can be obtained without use it.DARWIN CORTÉS CORTÉS 25
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p δε −− . In order to calculate how kind 1 believes 2 is we
have to specify 1’s belief about what 2 believes that 1 will do. Denote by q” this second order belief
of 1 choosing NP. Then 1 believes that she gives teacher 1 a material payoff of q”(px + (1 - p)0) +
(1 - q”)(x - ε ) by her equilibrium strategy. If 2 always does not participate, 1’s payoff is q” x + (1 -
q”)(x + δ ), whereas if 2 always participates, 1’s payoff is q” 0 + (1 - q”)(x - ε ). Hence, 1’s belief about
2’s kindness of her equilibrium strategy is q” (px +(1 - p)0) +(1 - q”)(x - ε ) - 0.5(q” x +(1 - q” (x +δ )
+  q”0 + (1 - q”(x - ε )) = q” px - 0.5 ((1 - q”) ε   + (1 - q”)δ   + q” x). This implies that when 2 plays
the equilibrium strategy and the second order belief is q”, 1’s utility of no participation is given











1 δ ε ε δ , whereas 1’s utility of participation is











1 δ ε ε δ ε .
The former is larger than the latter if
() () ()() () () 0 ’ ’ ’ ’ 1 ’ ’ 1
2
1





 + − + − − + − + + − − x q q q px q p Y x p δ ε ε δ ε .
In equilibrium, the second order belief must be correct. Hence, if in equilibrium 1 does not
participate, the condition must hold for q” = 1, that is  ()() () 0
2
1





 − + − + − − x px p Y x px ε δ ε
In general we have a solution for p finding out the roots of the left-hand side quadratic equation.
To simplify calculations, let us assume  x
2
1
= ε . In this case the condition holds if p > 0.5. This in






2 (see the calculation of p in Remark 2c).
On the other hand, if in equilibrium 1 participates, the condition must not hold for q”=0.
Inserting for p and rearranging terms this leads to  () ()
() x













In order to have a mixed equilibrium, utility of no participation must be equal to the utility of
participation. This is the case when  () () ()() () 0 ’ ’ ’ ’ 1
2
1





 + − − + − + + − − x q q px q p Y x p δ ε δ ε .
Since in equilibrium the second order belief must be correct, that actual probability of no
participation, q, must be such that the condition is fulfilled. Substituting for p this implies that
() 2 2 2 2 1
2 2
2 2 1 1
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The other conditions of Remark 5c are necessary to guarantee that q is larger than zero and
smaller than 1.
On the other hand, we can also derive the solution for the sequential version of teachers’
game with trade union. It is enough to assume ε  = 0. Doing so, Remarks 1 and 3 remain unaffected.
Remarks 4 and 5a do not hold anymore, as Remark 2a does not. Results are summarized in the
following remarks.
Remark 1: If teacher 1 participates (chooses P), teacher 2 also participates in every SRE



















2 < , participation is 1’s unique equilibrium behaviour.
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